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With this inquiry I shall seek to establish that Thorstein Veblen 
advanced theories which related the vested interests with power. To 
accomplish this I shall first dissect the meanings behind Veblen’s 
definitions of “the vested interest”, “intangible assets” and “free 
income.” I then, using the previous analysis relate the state to vested 
interests and solidify their collective unity. After this connection I 
proceed onto analyzing the implications of the vested interest and 
how it relates to the common man. Power, normally analyzed within 
the context of political science is rarely spoken of within economics, 
this analysis strives to bring the idea of power into the realm of 
economics through Thorstein Veblen’s work, The Vested Interest and 
the Common Man [1919]. 
 
This inquiry seeks to establish that Thorstein Veblen advances 
ideas regarding the vested interests as these relate to power. Veblen 
(2013, 161) defines a vested interest as “a legitimate right to get 
something for nothing.” However, what does it mean to get something 
for nothing? Veblen (2013, 99) helps answer this question by 
purporting that “Vested interests are immaterial wealth, intangible 
assets.” Intangible assets, Veblen (2013, 169) teaches us, are the 
“chief and ordinary indication of free income, that is to say, of getting 
something for nothing.” Veblen (2013, 169) goes on to purport a 
vested interest as having the “assured customary claim to get 
something more in the way of income than a full equivalent for 
tangible performance in the way of productive work.” Which, in my 
view is the idea of getting something for nothing. 
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To better explain this viewpoint, I need to expand on the 
definitions for intangible assets and free income. To start, what 
separates a tangible asset and an intangible one? Veblen (2013, 68) 
proposes that tangible assets “represent the earning-capacity of any 
mechanically productive property” and intangible assets “represent 
assured income which cannot be assigned to any specific material 
factor as its productive source.” Veblen (2013, 68) goes on to teach us 
that the fundamental difference between tangible and intangible 
assets, is that intangible assets arise from business relations as 
opposed to industry. These business relations can be thought of, as 
Veblen (2013, 68) it, “derived from advantages of salesmanship . . .” 
This means that any assets or profits derived from salesmanship, such 
as advertising, investment, market control, etc. are in fact intangible 
assets. 
This brings the inquiry to the analysis of free income and its 
relation to intangible assets. To start, Veblen (2013, 71) teaches us 
that free income is “supernumerary and preferential”, meaning that 
the income gained is both in excess of what is needed and benefits 
one party or group over another. This “preferential excess” is an 
important concept when relating to intangible assets, and by extension 
the vested interest, serving as a bridging point between the vested 
interest and free income. As one would recall in the paper, a vested 
interest has a legitimate claim to get more in the way of income than 
would be equivalent for tangible performance in productive work. An 
easier way to state this would be that a vested interest has a legitimate 
claim to profit. However profit can be considered as preferential 
excess as it is more gain than is necessary and it benefits one party 
over another. Thus we can redefine the vested interests a final time: a 
vested interest has a legitimate claim to preferential excess. 
This redefining of the vested interests creates a powerful image, 
one that promises to evoke thoughts on the motives of Big Business. 
This implication borders intentional, as when Veblen wrote The 
Vested Interests and the Common Man, the big business of his day 
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was getting into full swing, Rockefeller’s Standard Oil and the U.S. 
Steel Corporation being full blown monopolies in the day. Indeed, 
Veblen (2013, 73-74) teaches us about the privileges monopolies 
hold, specifically the ability to restrain trade by way of controlling the 
output of goods or services. In my view, it would also be a very safe 
assumption that any business that is sufficiently large shares a similar 
level of privilege. Thus we have a good indicator that what Veblen 
wrote on in the early 1900’s would still be an accurate representation 
of the current situation. 
However, the vested interests do not merely exist within the 
confines of business, big or otherwise. Veblen (2013, 123) teaches us 
that the vested interest was once known as the Divine Right of Kings 
and that “It was of a proprietary nature, a vested interest, something in 
the nature of intangible assets which embodied the usufruct of the 
realm, including its population and resources, and which could be 
turned to account in the pursuit of princely or dynastic advantages at 
home and abroad.” This proprietary nature meant that the sovereign 
state1 effectively had monopoly ownership over the land they ruled, as 
long as it was within the rights of usufruct2. The nature of this 
monopoly was one of preferential excess and indeed the claim to 
sovereignty is considered a legitimate one when claimed by the state. 
This allows for a relation of sovereignty, equating the power of 
the state, to the vested interests of business. For this we must look at 
intangible assets and free income again, to redefine them in context to 
the state. When looking at intangible assets we can clearly see, from 
my point of view, that rather than being derived from the advantages 
of salesmanship, we observe a derivation from the advantages of 
1 Sovereignty is derived from the Divine Right of Kings and, because of this 
derivation, the sovereign state in this paper is equated to having the same vested 
interest as the Divine Right of Kings because of this derivation. 
2 Usufruct is the ancient Roman law that states one has the right to enjoy the 
use and advantages of another’s property short of the destruction or waste of its 
substance. 
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sovereignty. Sovereignty, having the advantage of being considered 
legitimate by the majority, has by definition, the power and legitimate 
claim to vie for its preferential excess.  
This brings us back to the idea of free income; getting something 
for nothing. However, what more can a state gain within its borders? 
The answer is, if it is sovereign it has nothing to gain, as within its 
borders it is a monopoly. So how does a sovereign state gain 
preferential excess? It accomplishes this by one of two ways, first, it 
can conquer nations with less military prowess and second, it can 
protect and further domestic vested interests. The first method of 
preferential excess, conquering nations, is universally frowned upon 
today and only done indirectly (annexation), if at all. However, this 
method was once quite popular, as could be seen with colonialism 
during Veblen’s time. Which Veblen (2013, 129) wrote about, stating 
“There still are conferences, stipulations and guarantees between the 
Powers, touching the “Open Door” in China, or the equitable partition 
of Africa, which read like a chapter on Honor among Thieves.” 
The second is similar, however the playing field is altered. 
Nations now move about the globe as they can, quote on quote 
“protecting their interests” as it is often said, and when attacking a 
foreign state, it is not a violation of sovereignty, rather the invading 
state is protecting interests, helping out the locals or seeking justice 
upon an attacker. They are all buzzwords, a nation protecting their 
interests in a foreign country either means the nation has some 
strategic value (as with the Crimea) or economic value (as with Saudi 
Arabia). A nation helping out locals is priming an economy or state to 
become an allied interest, and a nation seeking justice upon an 
attacker is looking for an excuse to remove an enemy (as with 
Saddam Hussein). To put this into the terms of business, Veblen 
(2013, 130) forwards the notion that traders and investors to foreign 
nations are able to net a larger profit in their ventures if their national 
government is powerful, aggressive, unscrupulous and overbearing, 
which can be expected if the government is administered by those of 
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the vested interests. However in the case of businesses and nations, 
the invading government eventually leaves, the old state’s sovereignty 
intact, albeit in name only. 
But if a government cannot resort to justified force and will not 
resort to unjustified force, how does it aid the vested interests to 
increase its preferential excess? Veblen (2013, 132) only addressed 
the usage of tariff barriers to keep the price up and the supply down, 
however, this is only one of several available levers of power. 
Economic sanctions have become a powerful tool in the arsenal of the 
vested interests who sway the state for their benefit. These economic 
sanctions can be tariffs, but they also include embargos, asset freezes, 
and other methods which serve to isolate an economy. These 
economic sanctions are often considered ineffective in the realm of 
changing a foreign state’s policy, but are brutally effective at 
removing an economy not operating by the rules laid forth by the 
vested interests from the world at large. However, there is another 
tool in the arsenal of the state swayed by vested interests, preferential 
treatment. This preferential treatment is the opposite of economic 
sanction, indeed, trade is opened up to an even greater degree, tariffs 
are lowered or even removed and life is good for the allies of the 
nation swayed by the vested interests. 
A final line of questioning remains- how do the vested interests 
affect the common man? Veblen (2013, 160) posits that “the 
population of these civilized countries now falls into two main 
classes…a division, not between those who have something and those 
who have nothing…but between those who own wealth enough to 
make it count and those who do not.” Veblen (2013, 161) goes on to 
detail the class of wealth as being the “kept classes”, which include 
not merely the vested interests of business, but the clergy, the nation3
3 Veblen in the text writes about “the Crown” instead of the nation/state. I use 
nation or state instead of the Crown specifically for the reason nation or state is a 
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and the agents of the nation, military and civil. These kept classes are 
the class that has enough wealth or rather, preferential excess, to 
count. The other class, the one which does not have the wealth or 
preferential excess to count, is the realm of the common man. But 
what does it mean to “count”? Since preferential excess comes from 
intangible assets and is tied directly to vested interests, we can 
determine that being a vested interest is what truly counts.  
Why is this so?  It is a function of power, the common man can 
usually only get what he can get. Veblen (2013, 111) teaches us that 
“A more powerful corporation is in a position to make its own terms 
with greater freedom, which it then is for the workmen to take or 
leave, but ordinarily to take.” Since it has already been established 
that the state operates along similar lines as a corporation, it may not, 
in my view, be a stretch to affirm that the kept classes in general 
operate along similar lines of power. This means that the mass of 
common men, who the workmen are a part of, do not have the ability 
to make their own terms. Rather, they react to the terms of the kept 
classes. Veblen (2013, 165) shows us that this affects farmers, 
“caught between the vested interests who buy cheap and the vested 
interests who sell dear” and that to not take what is offered results in 
what Veblen (2013,  165) calls “getting left”4. Even the common 
businessman cannot claim to be of the kept classes, only a middleman 
for them, as Veblen (2013, 166) muses, “He still manages to sell dear, 
but he does not commonly buy cheap, except what he buys of the 
farmer, for the massive vested interests in the background now decide 
for him…how much his traffic will bear.” 
more relevant term for today and the nation or state is not much different from the 
Crown described by Veblen. 
4 I believe the concept of “getting left” refers to the idea that if you don’t 
accept what is given to you, you get nothing instead. 
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However, the common man is not without his own variant of the 
vested interests. Veblen (2013, 164) describes the AF of L5 as not 
being made up of members who could be counted among the kept 
classes. Rather, the organization and its leadership collects income 
from its underlying members, which is a form of free income. 
Furthermore, it pursues the interests of the organization and seeks a 
form of preferential excess over the common lot of men. In my view, 
the preferential excess sought, is not one of dominance over others as 
is with the kept classes, but rather a balancing of power with the kept 
classes. However, Veblen (2013, 165) brings up the valid point—that 
the vested interest which animates the A. F. of L.—may be “nothing 
more to the point than an aimless survival.” Yet while this may be 
true, it would be a shame not to include it in this analysis as it 
provides a clear case that vested interests do always share the same 
goals. 
This inquiry has sought to establish that Thorstein Veblen 
advanced ideas regarding the vested interest as they relate to power. 
These vested interests are considered to have a legitimate claim to 
something for nothing, or what has been referred to in the paper as 
preferential excess. This redefinition is more accurate when applied to 
the workings of power than when applied to the mechanics of 
economics. It is ultimately the same definition in meaning, but uses 
different language. This difference in language allows for the vested 
interests of the divine right of kings or state, to more easily be 
analyzed side by side with the vested interests of business. The 
analysis between the two interests, causes a realization that they share 
similar interests and conduct similar things for the benefit of one 
another, these similarities are where the vested interest and its claim 
to preferential excess relates to power. Yet it is within the analysis of 
the common man that two classes emerge:  the kept classes consisting 
purely of the vested interests, and the common class.  
 
5 The AF of L is the American Federation of Labor. 
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The common man often has no choice to conform because he has 
his own form of vested interest. This vested interest is different as 
shown by the A.F. of L.  It operates in such a way that those who 
make up the vested interest are not themselves of the kept classes, but 
rather still of the common lot. Yet the organization acts in the same 
ways as a vested interest, by gaining the ability to counter the terms 
which the kept classes impose upon them. This vested interest is by 
far the most interesting, it is a vested interest with the common lot as 
opposed to the kept classes, threatening to break the dichotomy 
between the kept classes and the common lot. It is a terrible shame 
Veblen did not have more examples of similar vested interests in his 
book The Vested Interest and the Common Man, as it implies that 
there is a counter power. Something which denies the power garnered 
by vested interests and their claim to preferential excess. It is the hope 
that future research by myself and others will fill the gap in 
understanding, turning a hunch into elucidation. 
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